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128 S. Ct. 2559
Decided: June 23, 2008
Question Presented:
May an appellate court, without a motion from the pros-
ecution, increase a sentence when the district court misinterpret-
ed the case law and sentenced the defendant to a term less than
the mandatory minimum?
Facts:
Greenlaw was charged in the United States District
Court for the District of Minnesota with eight offenses, and was
found guilty on seven of those charges. Included were two
counts of violating 18 U.S.C. § 924 (c)(1)(A), which prohibits
carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence
or drug trafficking crime. 
According to the statute, a first conviction for violating
§ 924(c) carries a mandatory minimum term of five years, if the
firearm is simply carried.  For a second or subsequent convic-
tion, the mandatory minimum jumps to twenty-five years
whether the weapon is discharged or only carried. 
At sentencing, the district court, over the Government’s
objection, held that a § 924(c) conviction does not constitute a
“second or subsequent” conviction when it is “charged in the
same indictment” as the defendant’s first § 924(c) conviction.
The district sentenced Greenlaw to a total of 442 months, a little
over thirty-five years, for all his convictions. He received a five
year sentence for the first § 924(c) conviction and ten years for
the second § 924(c) conviction, rejecting the government’s
request for the twenty-five year minimum for a “second or sub-
sequent” offense.
Greenlaw appealed to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit arguing that his sentence for all of
his charges should have been fifteen years. The Government
only argued that Greenlaw’s sentence should be affirmed.
However, the Government also noted the district court’s error,
and that Greenlaw’s sentence should have been fifteen years
longer. 
The court of appeals vacated Greenlaw’s sentence and
instructed the district court “to impose the [statutorily mandated]
consecutive minimum sentence of 25 years. The court of appeals
held that it had discretion to raise and correct the district court’s
error on its own initiative under the “plain error rule.”
Decision:
Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court
holding that absent a Government appeal or cross-appeal, the
sentence Greenlaw received should not have been increased. 
The Court reasoned that under the adversarial system,
“parties frame the issues for decision and assign to the courts the
role of neutral arbiter of matters the parties present.” Under the
procedural rules for filing appeals and cross appeals parties have
fair notice. This allows the parties to evaluate the risks associat-
ed with appeals and tailor their arguments accordingly. When a
circuit court increases a sentence without notice, it deprives the
defendant of the ability to assess his risk. The defendant “essen-
tially appeals at his own peril.” The Court suggested that
Greenlaw might have made different strategic decisions “had he
known soon after filing his notice of appeal that he risked a 15-
year increase in an already lengthy sentence.” 
The Court also looked at 18 U.S.C. § 3742(b) which
articulates the procedure the government must follow to appeal
a sentence.  Section 3742(b) states: “the Government may not
further prosecute [the] appeal without the personal approval of
the Attorney General, the Solicitor General, or a deputy solicitor
general designated by the Solicitor General.” The Court believed
that it would “severely undermine Congress’ instruction were
appellate judges to ‘sally forth’ on their own motion to take up
errors adverse to the Government when the designated
Department of Justice officials have not authorized an appeal
from the sentence the trial court imposed.”
128 S.Ct. 2020 (2007)
Decided: June 2, 2008
Questions Presented:
Under 19 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1), the federal money laun-
dering statute, which makes it a crime to engage in a financial
transaction using the proceeds from certain illegal activities with
the intent of promoting these activities or concealing the pro-
ceeds, are proceeds the gross receipts from the illegal activities
or only the profits?
Facts:
From the 1970s until 1994, Respondent Santos operated
a lottery in Indiana that was illegal under state law. A jury found
Santos guilty of one count of conspiracy to run an illegal gam-
bling business, one count of running an illegal gambling busi-
ness, one count of conspiracy to launder money, and two counts
of money laundering. Respondent Diaz pleaded guilty to con-
spiracy to launder money. The court of appeals affirmed the con-
victions and sentences. 
Respondents filed motions under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, col-
laterally attacking their convictions and sentences. The district
court rejected all of their claims but one, a challenge to their
money-laundering convictions based on the Seventh Circuit’s
subsequent decisions in United States v. Scialabba, 249 F.3d 583
(7th Cir. 2001), which held that the federal money laundering
statute’s prohibition of transactions involving criminal “pro-
ceeds” applies only to transactions involving criminal profits,
not criminal receipts. 
The court of appeals affirmed, rejecting the
Government’s contention that Scialabba was wrong and should
be overruled.
Decision:
Justice Scalia announced the judgment of the Court
holding that the word “proceeds” in the federal money-launder-
ing statute 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) applies only to transac-
tions involving criminal profits, not criminal receipts.
18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) criminalizes transactions
to promote criminal activity. The provision uses the term “pro-
ceeds” in describing two elements the Government must prove
of the offense: that a charged transaction “in fact involved the
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proceeds of specified unlawful activity” (the proceeds element),
and that a defendant knew “that the property involved in” the
charged transaction “represented the proceeds of some form of
unlawful activity” (the knowledge element).
The Court noted that the federal money-laundering
statute does not define “proceeds.” Congress has defined “pro-
ceeds” in various criminal provisions, but sometimes has defined
it to mean “receipts” and sometimes “profits.”
Under the rule of lenity, ambiguous language in a crim-
inal statute must be interpreted in favor of the defendants sub-
jected to them. Following this rule, the Court found that because
the “profits” definition of “proceeds” is always more defendant-
friendly than the “receipts” definition, the rule of lenity dictates
that the former should be adopted.
The Court went on to state that if “proceeds” meant
“receipts,” nearly every violation of the illegal-lottery statute
would also be a violation of the money-laundering statute,
because paying a winning bettor is a transaction involving
receipts that the defendant intends to promote the carrying on of
the lottery. Since few lotteries, if any, will not pay their winners,
the statute criminalizing illegal lotteries would “merge” with the
money-laundering statute. 
The Court’s holding was limited to Justice Stevens’ rea-
sons in his concurring opinion because Stevens’ vote gave the
Court a majority opinion. Therefore the holding of the cases is
limited to “proceeds” means “profits” when there is no legisla-
tive history to the contrary. 
Justice Alito wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by Chief
Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy Breyer.
128 S.Ct. 1203 (2008)
Decided: March 19, 2008
Question Presented:
Did the state's dismissal by peremptory challenge of all
of the black potential jurors, combined with the prosecution's
comparisons of the case to the O.J. Simpson trial, amount to a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause?
Facts:
Petitioner was charged and convicted of first-degree
murder and was sentenced to death. Petitioner was found guilty
of killing a male whom his estranged wife had been on a date
with and wounding his estranged wife.
During jury selection at the trial, eighty-five prospec-
tive jurors were questioned as members of a panel. Thirty-six of
these survived challenges for cause; five of the thirty-six were
black and all five of the prospective black jurors were eliminat-
ed by the prosecution through the use of peremptory strikes. The
jury found Petitioner guilty of first-degree murder and deter-
mined that he should receive the death penalty. 
On direct appeal, the Louisiana Supreme Court condi-
tionally affirmed Petitioner’s conviction. The court rejected
Petitioner’s Batson claim but remanded the case for a nuc pro
tunc determination of Petitioner’s competency to stand trial.
Two justices dissented and would have found a Batson violation.
On remand, the trial court found that Petitioner had
been competent to stand trial, and the Louisiana Supreme Court
affirmed that determination. Petitioner appealed to the Supreme
Court for a writ of certiorari, and while his petition was pending,
the Supreme Court decided Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231
(2005). The Supreme Court granted the petition, vacated the
judgment, and remanded the case to the Louisiana Supreme
Court for further consideration in light of Miller-El. 
On remand, the Louisiana Supreme Court again reject-
ed Snyder’s Batson claim, this time by a vote of four to three.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari. 
Decision:
Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court holding
that the trial court committed clear error in its ruling on a Batson
objection.
The Court’s analysis of Petitioner’s Batson claim cen-
tered on the prosecution’s strikes of two black jurors, Jeffrey
Brooks and Elaine Scott. The Court did not consider the strike of
Juror Scott because it found the trial court committed clear error
in overruling Petitioner’s Batson objection with respect to Juror
Brooks. 
In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), the Court
articulated a three-step process for a trial court to use in adjudi-
cating a claim that a peremptory challenge was based on race: 1)
a defendant must make a prima facie showing that a peremptory
challenge has been exercised on the basis of race; 2) if that
showing has been made, the prosecution must offer a race-neu-
tral basis for striking the juror in question and 3) in light of the
parties’ submissions, the trial court must determine whether the
defendant has shown purposeful discrimination. 
In Miller-El, the Court held that a court must consider
all the circumstances that bear upon the issue of racial animosi-
ty when ruling on a Batson objection, or in reviewing a ruling
claimed to be Batson error.
During voir dire Juror Brooks initially expressed con-
cern about missing class because he was a student teacher and
needed to complete a certain amount of teaching hours. The trial
judge’s clerked called the dean of Juror Brooks’ program, who
assured the clerk that Juror Brooks would not be in danger of not
completing the request hours by serving on the jury. After being
informed on this, Juror Brooks did not express any reservation
with serving on the jury.  Even so, the prosecution still struck
Brooks because he appeared nervous and they feared he would
return a guilty verdict of a lesser charge so that he could return
to his teaching responsibilities quickly. The trial court accepted
the prosecution’s explanation and made no finding about
Brooks’ demeanor.
The Court found the prosecution’s stated reasons for
striking Juror Brooks highly speculative and even more implau-
sible when compared to Juror Laws’, a white juror, personal sit-
uation. Laws approached the court and offered strong reasons
why serving on the sequestered jury would cause him hardship.
Mr. Laws stated that he was a self-employed contractor who had
projects that needed his attention. He also informed his court
that his wife just had a hysterectomy, that he thus needed to take
care of his children. Even given these work and family obliga-
tions, which were substantially more burdensome than Juror
Brooks’ obligations, the prosecution still attempted to elicit
assurances that he would be able to serve despite these obliga-
tions.
The Court questioned why the prosecution did not share
the same concern that Juror Laws would return a lesser verdict
to shorten the trial as they had with Juror Brooks.  
The prosecution’s proffer of this pre-textual explanation
gave rise to an inference of discriminatory intent. The Court
believed that “it was enough to recognize that a peremptory
strike shown to have been motivated in substantial part by dis-
criminatory intent could not be sustained based on any lesser
showing by the prosecution.”
Justices Thomas and Scalia filed a dissenting opinion.
128 S.Ct. 1581 (2008)
Decided: April 16, 2008
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QUESTION PRESENTED:
Is a felony driving offense a “violent felony” for the purposes of
the Armed Career Criminal Act?
FACTS:
The Armed Career Criminal Act imposes a special
mandatory fifteen year prison term upon felons who unlawfully
possess a firearm and who also have three or more previous con-
victions for committing certain drug crimes or “violent
felonies.” 
In September 2004, New Mexico police officers
received a report that Larry Begay, the Petitioner, had threatened
his sister and aunt with a rifle. The police arrested him. Begay
subsequently conceded he was a felon and pleaded guilty to a
federal charge of unlawful possession of a firearm in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Begay’s presentence report said that he
had been convicted a dozen times for DUI which, under New
Mexico’s law, becomes a felony the fourth (or subsequent) time
an individual is convicted. The sentencing judge consequently
found that Begay had at least three prior convictions for a crime
“punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.”
The judge also concluded that Begay’s “three felony DUI con-
victions involve conduct that presents a serious potential risk of
physical injury to another.” The judge consequently concluded
that Begay had three or more prior convictions for a “violent
felony” and should receive a sentence that reflected a mandato-
ry minimum prison term of fifteen years. 
Begay appealed, claiming that DUI is not a “violent
felony” within the terms of the statute. The court of appeals
panel by a vote of two to one rejected the claim. 
DISCUSSION:
Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court hold-
ing that for the purposes of § 922(g)(1), “a prior record of DUI,
a strict liability crime, differs from a prior record of violent and
aggressive crimes committed intentionally such as arson, burgla-
ry, extortion, or crimes involving the use of explosives.” 
The Court found the provision’s listed examples—bur-
glary, arson, extortion, or crimes involving the use of explo-
sives—illustrate the kinds of crimes that fall within the statute’s
scope. “Their presence indicates that the statute covers only sim-
ilar crimes, rather than every crime that presents a serious poten-
tial risk of physical injury to another.”
The Court reasoned that DUI differs from the listed
crimes because an offender in a DUI case need not have any
criminal intent. “The listed crimes all typically involve purpose-
ful, violent and aggressive conduct.” That conduct is such that it
makes more likely that an offender, later possessing a gun, will
use that gun deliberately to harm a victim. Crimes committed in
such a purposeful, violent, and aggressive manner are potential-
ly more dangerous when firearms are involved, and such crimes
are characteristic of the armed career criminal, the eponym of
the statute.  DUI, however, is comparable to a strict liability
crime.
Justices Thomas, Souter, and Alito dissented.
128 S.Ct. 2198 (2008)
Decided: June 12, 2008
QUESTION PRESENTED:
Must a judge give both the prosecution and the defense
advance notice before imposing a criminal sentence that departs
from the Federal Sentencing Guidelines?
FACTS:
Petitioner pleaded guilty to one count of making a
threatening interstate communication, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 875(c). Petitioner admitted to sending his ex-wife and new
husband threatening e-mails. The presentence report (PSR), in
addition to describing the threatening e-mails, reported that
Petitioner had asked another inmate to kill his ex-wife’s new
husband. The PSR advised against an adjustment for acceptance
of responsibility and recommended a Guidelines sentencing
range of forty-one to fifty-one months of imprisonment, based
on enhancements for violating court protective orders, making
multiple threats, and intending to carry out those threats. 
After a sentencing hearing, the judge found that
Petitioner had deliberately terrorized his ex-wife and intended to
carry out one or more of his threats. The judge went on to state
that she was disturbed by Petitioner’s conduct and believed the
guideline range was not high enough and therefore sentenced
him to the statutory maximum. 
Petitioner objected on the grounds that he did not have
notice of the upward departure. The Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit affirmed Petitioner’s sentence, reasoning that
Rule 32(h) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure did not
apply because “the above guidelines sentence imposed by the
district court in this case was a variance, not a guidelines depar-
ture.”
DISCUSSION:
Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court hold-
ing that Rule 32(h) does not apply to a variance from a recom-
mended Guidelines range.
In Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129 (1991), the
Court held that “the provision of Rule 32 that allowed parties an
opportunity to comment on the appropriate sentence- now Rule
32(i)(1)(C)- would be ‘render[ed] meaningless’ unless the defen-
dant were given notice of any contemplated departure.” At that
time, the Sentencing Guidelines were mandatory. 
In United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), the
Court invalidated the mandatory features of the Guidelines.
“Now faced with advisory Guidelines, neither the Government
nor the defendant may place the same degree of reliance on the
type of ‘expectancy’ that gave rise to a special need for notice in
Burns.” Indeed, a sentence outside the Guidelines carries no pre-
sumption of unreasonableness. 
The Court reasoned that because the Guidelines are no
longer mandatory, the justification in Burns no longer exists. In
addition, the Court feared that adding a special notice require-
ment whenever a judge contemplated a variance would create
unnecessary delay; a judge who concludes during the sentencing
hearing that a variance is appropriate may be forced to continue
the hearing even where the content of the Rule 32(h) notice
would not affect the parties’ presentation of argument and evi-
dence. 
The Court noted that the record in this case did not indi-
cate that a statement announcing a possible departure would
have changed the parties’ presentations in any material way.
Justices Kennedy, Souter, Ginsberg, and Breyer dissent-
ed.
128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008)
Decided: June 25, 2008
QUESTION PRESENTED:
Irizarry v. United States Kennedy v. Louisiana
Does the Louisiana statute allowing the death penalty
for the rape of a child under the age of twelve violate the Eight
Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment?
FACTS:
Petitioner was charged by the State of Louisiana with
the aggravated rape of his then-eight-year-old stepdaughter.
After a jury trial Petitioner was convicted and sentenced to death
under a state statute authorizing capital punishment for the rape
of a child under twelve years of age. Louisiana was in the minor-
ity of jurisdictions that authorized the death penalty for the
crime of child rape. The Supreme Court of Louisiana affirmed
the judgment. 
DISCUSSION:
Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court
holding that the Louisianan statute was unconstitutional because
the Eighth Amendment prohibits the death penalty for the crime
of child rape. 
In Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977), the Court
held it would be unconstitutional to execute an offender who had
raped an adult woman. In Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782
(1982), the Court overturned the capital sentence of a defendant
who aided and abetted a robbery during which a murder was
committed but did not himself kill, attempt to kill, or intend that
a killing would take place. 
The Court stated that the Eight Amendment “draw[s] its
meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society. Evolving standards of decency
must embrace and express respect for the dignity of the person,
and the punishment of criminals must conform to that rule.” 
In light of this evolving standard of decency, the Court
pointed to a national consensus opposed to the death penalty for
child rapists. Thirty-seven jurisdictions have the death penalty.
Only six of those jurisdictions authorize the death penalty for
rape of a child. Statistics also confirm a social consensus against
the death penalty for the crime of child rape. No individual has
been executed for the rape of an adult or child since 1964, and
no execution for any other non-homicide offenses have been
conducted since 1963. 
The Court found a distinction between intentional first
degree murder on the one hand and non-homicide crimes against
individual persons, including child rape, on the other. “The lat-
ter crimes may be devastating in their harm, but in terms of
moral depravity and of the injury to the person and to the public,
they cannot be compared to murder in their severity and irrevo-
cability.”
The Court concluded that, because it is not evident that
the child rape victim’s hurt is lessened when the law permits the
death of the perpetrator, the death penalty for child rape not only
would not further retributive purposes but also would raise sys-
temic concerns. The problem of unreliable, induced, and even
imagined child testimony creates a “special risk of wrongful
execution” in some child rape cases. 
Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion joined by Chief
Justice Roberts, and Justices Scalia and Thomas.
128 S.Ct. 1520
Decided: April 16, 2008
QUESTION PRESENTED:
Do lethal injections in capital cases create an unneces-
sary risk of pain and suffering in violation of the Eight
Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punish-
ment?
FACTS:
Thirty-six states use a three-drug combination in their
lethal injection protocol. These drugs are administered in the fol-
lowing order: 1) sodium thiopental, which is a fast acting barbi-
turate sedate that induces a deep coma-like unconsciousness
when given in specified amounts and ensures that the prisoner
does not experience any pain; 2) pancuronium bromide which is
a paralytic agent that inhibits all muscular and skeletal move-
ments and stops respiration; and 3) potassium chloride which
induces cardiac arrest by interfering with the electrical signals
that stimulate contractions of the heart.  In 1998, Kentucky
replaced electrocution with lethal injection as its method of exe-
cution. Only one person has been executed in Kentucky since the
Commonwealth adopted lethal injection. 
Petitioners were convicted of two counts of capital mur-
der and sentenced to death. The Kentucky Supreme Court upheld
the convictions and sentences on direct appeal. After Petitioners
exhausted all of their state and federal collateral remedies, they
sued three state officials and Franklin Circuit Court of Kentucky
to challenge the constitutionality of lethal injection. After a
seven day bench trial, the state trial court upheld the procedures.
The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed.
DISCUSSION:
Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court
holding that the procedures followed by Kentucky were not
unconstitutional.The Court believed Kentucky’s protocol was
not objectively intolerable because it is widely tolerated. Thirty-
six states and the federal government sanction capital punish-
ment and have adopted lethal injection as their method of execu-
tion. Thirty states and the federal government use the same
three-drug protocol as Kentucky.
Petitioners contend that the method is unconstitutional
because there is a significant risk that the procedures used by
Kentucky will not be followed. The Court commented that
Petitioners did not show that the risk of an inadequate dose of
the first drug, sodium thiopental (which renders prisoner uncon-
scious) was substantial. The Court also believed that the State
trial court’s finding that if the manufacturer’s instructions for
reconstitution of the sodium thiopental are followed, there is a
minimal risk of improper mixing, is not clearly erroneous. 
The Court further noted that Kentucky had several
important safeguards to ensure that an adequate dose of sodium
thiopental is delivered to the prisoner. The Court rejected the
Petitioners’ proposed barbiturates-only protocol because no
findings had been made on the effectiveness of that procedure. 
The Court countered the Petitioners’ concern that the
Kentucky protocol lacks a systematic mechanism for monitoring
the anesthetic depth by arguing that proper dose of thiopental
obviates the concern that a prisoner will not be sufficiently
sedated. Petitioners agreed that if administered as instructed, the
Kentucky protocol would result in painless deaths.
Justices Souter and Ginsberg dissented.
128 S.Ct. 2783
Decided: June 26, 2008
QUESTION PRESENTED: 
Do three District of Columbia firearms ordinances: D.C.
Code Section 7-2502.02(a)(4) (barring the registration of hand-
guns); D.C. Code Section 22-4504(a) (prohibiting carrying a pis-
tol without a license); and D.C. Code section 7-2507.02 (requir-
ing that all lawfully owned firearms be kept unleaded and either
disassembled or trigger locked) violate the Second Amendment
rights of individuals who are not affiliated with any state-regu-
lated militia, but who wish to keep handguns and other firearms
107 Spring 2009
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for private use in their homes?
FACTS:
D.C. law banned hand gun possession by making it a
crime to carry an unregistered firearm and prohibiting the regis-
tration of handguns. D.C. authorized the Chief of Police to issue
one-year licenses, and required residents to keep unlawfully
owned firearms unloaded and disassembled or bound by a trig-
ger lock or similar devices. Respondent Heller, a special police
officer, applied to register a handgun he wished to keep at home,
but the District refused. He filed suit on Second Amendment
grounds, but the district court dismissed the suit. The Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reversed.
DISCUSSION:
Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court holding
that the Second Amendment protects an individual’s right to pos-
sess a firearm unconnected with service in a militia, and to use
that arm for traditionally lawful purposes, such as self-defense
within the home.
The Court looked to both text and history of the
Amendment in reaching its decision. The Court found that based
on the historical background of the Second Amendment, the
operative clause of the Amendment established an individual
right to carry weapons in cases of confrontation. This right, the
Court reasoned, like the First and Fourth Amendment is a preex-
isting right.
The Court found that the prefactory clause of the
Amendment announces the purpose for which the right was cod-
ified, but does not suggest that preserving the militia was the
only reason for the right. 
The Court also looked at state constitutions adopted at
the same time as the Second Amendment which include an arms-
bearing right. These states allow for an arms-bearing right
unconnected to militia service. Historic legal scholarship and
case law contemporaneous with the Amendment’s ratification
support the interpretation that the Amendment confers a right to
bear arms unconnected to militia service.  
The Court did find that"[l]ike most rights, the Second
Amendment is not unlimited. It is not a right to keep and carry
any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for what-
ever purpose." 




Decided: January 13, 2009
7th Circuit
QUESTION PRESENTED: 
Does defendant’s failure to report for confinement
“involve[] conduct that presents a serious potential risk of phys-
ical injury to another” such that conviction for escape based on
that failure to report is “violent felony” within the meaning of
the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924 (e)?
FACT: 
Petitioner Deondry Chambers was sentenced to a fifteen
year mandatory prison sentence for being a felon in possession
of a firearm. The Court relied on The Armed Career Criminal
Act (ACCA) which required a fifteen year sentence for a defen-
dant found guilty of possessing a weapon with a criminal record
containing three or more “violent felonies.” Petitioner disputed
the claim that his previous conviction for failure to report to
weekend confinement, fit the definition of “violent felony”
which was defined as a crime that “involves conduct that pres-
ents a serious potential risk of physical injury to anoth-
er,”§924(e)(2)(B)(ii). The Illinois statue that Petitioner was
found guilty of violating classified failure to report as the legal
equivalent of escaping from jail. 
DISCUSION:
Justice Breyer wrote the opinion for a unanimous Court
holding that failure to report did not meet the definition of a
“violent crime” as defined by the ACCA, because it did not
involve “serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” §
924(e)(2)(B)(ii). Though the Respondent argued that a suspect
who fails to report is more likely to engage in violence the Court
found such reasoning unpersuasive. The Respondent’s claims
that three similar “failure to report” cases ended in violence were
statistically insignificant in light of a United States Sentencing
Commission report showing no violence in 160 federal failure-
to-report cases over two recent years. 
Justice Alito authored a concurring opinion, which
Justice Thomas joined, imploring Congress to specifically list
which crimes it sought to include in the ACCA. 
07-513
Decided: January 14, 2009
11th Circuit
QUESTION PRESENTED: 
Does Fourth Amendment require evidence found during
search incident to arrest to be suppressed when arresting officer
conducted arrest and search in sole reliance upon facially credi-
ble but erroneous information negligently provided by another
law enforcement agent?
FACT: 
Petitioner was arrested by Officers of Coffee County,
Alabama on an arrest warrant issued by police in nearby Dale
County. Though the warrant had been recalled, the database had
not been updated. The Petitioner was searched incident to the
arrest and was found in possession of drugs and a gun. Petitioner
was then indicted on federal gun and drug possession charges
and moved to suppress the evidence on the ground that his ini-
tial arrest had been illegal. Though the district court held that
there was a Fourth Amendment violation, the court held that the
exclusionary rule did not apply since the officers were acting on
good faith when they arrested the Petitioner. The Eleventh
Circuit affirmed, finding that the evidence was admissible under
the good-faith rule of United States v. Leon, 468 U. S. 897
(1984). 
DISCUSSION: 
The Chief Justice wrote for the majority, and held that
when police mistakes leading to an unlawful search are the result
of isolated negligence attenuated from the search, rather than
systemic error or reckless disregard of constitutional require-
ments, the exclusionary rule does not apply. The Court relied on
United States v. Leon, in finding that to trigger the exclusionary
rule, police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that exclu-
sion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that
such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system. The
conduct here was not so objectively culpable as to require exclu-
sion. The marginal benefits that might follow from suppressing
evidence obtained in these circumstances would not justify the
108Criminal Law Brief
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substantial costs of exclusion. Since the arrest resulted from out-
dated information, the arrest was the result of negligence, not a
deliberate attempt to violate the Petitioner’s civil rights. Thus
the use of the exclusionary rule was improper.   
07-544
9th Circuit
Decided: December 2, 2008
QUESTION PRESENTED:
Did Ninth Circuit fail to conform to “clearly estab-
lished” Supreme Court law, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d),
when it granted habeas corpus relief by deeming erroneous
instruction on one of two alternative theories of guilt to be
“structural error” requiring reversal because jury might have
relied on it?
FACT: 
Respondent was convicted in a California court of
felony murder. In providing the jury with instructions, the court
permitted the jury to find Respondent guilty of felony murder if
he formed the intent to aid and abet the underlying felony before
the murder, but they also permitted the jury to find him guilty if
he formed that intent only after the murder. The Ninth Circuit
classified the mistake as a “structural error” requiring reversal,
instead of a “trial error” which could have been found to be
harmless. 
DISCUSSION: 
In a per curiam decision, the Court held that the estab-
lished case law described in the cases of Neder v. United. States,
527 U.S. 1(1999), California v. Roy 519 U.S. 2 (1996), Pope v.
Illinois, 481 U.S. 497 (1987), and Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570
(1986), showed that the issue of invalid jury instructions should
be classified as “trial error” not a “structural error.” As a “trial
error” the task of the Appellate Court was to oversee a hearing
to determine whether the error may have prejudiced the jury
against the defendant. The Court held that the Ninth Circuit mis-
interpreted Supreme Court law when it simply assumed that the
Jury relied on the improper instruction without a proper hearing. 
07-608
4th Circuit
Decided: February 24, 2009
QUESTION PRESENTED:
To qualify as “misdemeanor crime of domestic vio-
lence” under 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A), which defines that term
for purposes of Section 922(g)(9), must offense have as element
domestic relationship between offender and victim?
FACT: 
Respondent was arrested for violating 18 U. S. C. §922
(g)(9), by being in a person convicted of “a misdemeanor crime
of domestic violence,” while in possession of a firearm. The con-
viction stemmed from a 1994 case in West Virginia, in which
Respondent was arrested for attacking his then-wife. The West
Virginia domestic violence statute did not require a domestic
relationship to exist between the victim and the accused in order
to qualify as a domestic violence case. 
DISCUSSION: 
Justice Ginsburg wrote for the majority, holding that
though a domestic relationship must be established beyond a rea-
sonable doubt in a § 922(g)(9) firearms possession prosecution,
it need not be a defining element of the predicate offense.
Though § 921(a)(33)(A), does require that the underlying
offense contain a “domestic relationship,” the definition does
not require the predicate-offense statute to include, as an ele-
ment, the existence of that domestic relationship. Even though
the West Virginia statute did not require a domestic relationship
to exist between Respondent and his alleged victim, it is not nec-
essary for prosecution under § 922(g)(9). The statute only
requires for the Government to make the argument that the
underlying conviction was “an offense . . . committed by” the
defendant against a spouse or other domestic victim.
07-772
9th Circuit
Decided: January 21, 2009
QUESTION PRESENTED:
(1) In reviewing due process challenge to jury instruc-
tions brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, must federal courts accept
state court determination that instructions fully and correctly set
out state law governing accomplice liability? (2) When accom-
plice liability instructions correctly set forth state law, is it
unreasonable application of clearly established federal law to
conclude that there was no reasonable likelihood that jury mis-
applied instructions so as to relieve prosecution of burden of
proving all elements of crime?
FACT: 
Respondent Sarausad drove the car in a drive by shoot-
ing at a high school, in which the front seat passenger killed a
student. Respondent, the shooter and another passenger were
tried on murder charges. Respondent and the other passenger
argued that they were not accomplices to murder because they
had not known of the shooters plans. In her closing argument,
the prosecutor said of the Respondent that he was “in for a dime,
in for a dollar.” The jury received two instructions that directly
quoted Washington’s accomplice-liability law. The jury convict-
ed, and Respondent appealed.
DISCUSSION: 
Justice Thomas wrote for the majority, holding since the
jury’s decision resulted from proper instructions, and because
the state-court decision did not result in an “unreasonable appli-
cation of . . . clearly established Federal law,” §2254(d)(1),the
Ninth Circuit erred in granting habeas relief to the Respondent. 
A defendant challenging the constitutionality of a jury
instruction that quotes a state statute must show both that the
instruction was ambiguous and that there was “a reasonable like-
lihood” that the jury applied the instruction in a way that
relieved the State of its burden of proving every element of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U. S.
62, 72. In this case the instructions themselves were unambigu-
ous, and thus the Ninth Circuit should have ended its inquiry at
that point. 
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